Dear Readers,

You are looking at the first issue of our “Edition”— the premiere of a new format for ideas and insights on current topics, for fact-based knowledge and experience-driven expertise. As a project management agency, we are committed to social progress. We would therefore be delighted if the articles in this issue were read, shared and reflected upon, and if they sparked discussion. For that is precisely how progress is achieved.

The theme of our first issue is democracy education. This is no coincidence. Progress thrives on diversity of opinion and academic openness within a democratic state governed by the rule of law. Democracy is the foundation upon which a community of people within a society can develop positively in freedom.

But democracy does not happen on its own. It must be learned, practiced, and actively shaped. It is an ongoing educational task within rapidly changing conditions. Artificial intelligence and social media platforms are profoundly altering the building of public opinion and public discourse. They offer new opportunities for information and exchange, but they are also drivers of disinformation and polarisation.

How can democracy education respond to these changes? How can it succeed under new conditions and thereby strengthen the foundations of an open and prosperous society? That is the focus of this issue.

We hope you find our new “Edition” inspiring.



Klaus Uckel

Chairman of the Executive Management



As a result, the extreme fringes of the political spectrum are becoming increasingly attractive to more and more citizens; in parts of Europe, far-right or even fascist positions in particular are no longer ostracised or confined to the fringes of the spectrum. Rather, these views now extend deep into the middle classes – as the so-called Leipzig Authoritarianism Study^{> 4} has recently demonstrated once again: There, too, authoritarian dynamics and far-right attitudes are increasingly being normalized. Not least against the backdrop of such developments, sociologists Carolin Amlinger and Oliver Nachtwey argue in their new book that today’s autocrats do not seize political power through violent coups, but are often democratically elected. For this reason, the authors also speak of “democratic fascism”^{> 5}, which is anchored in democracy and sees itself as its renewer. This sets it in contrast to historical fascism, which fought against democracy.



AI Technologies, Algorithm-Driven Platforms, and Young People’s Media Use

In parallel with this political cycle, democracies are facing additional pressure from current technological developments. AI technologies are not, in and of themselves, a force hostile to democracy – what matters are the contexts in which they are used and the interests of the actors behind them. However, the neo-reactionary worldviews of influential tech actors are shaping the design of many of these systems. According to Rainer Mühlhoff, the aggressive culture of innovation they advocate “does more than just dismantle political and moral constraints – it brings about a massive shift in power away from democratic institutions and toward private-sector actors”^{> 6}. Concepts such as digital solutionism – the idea that complex social problems can be solved primarily through technology – also shape the self-image of many influential tech actors^{> 7} and influence the design of the platforms that young people, in particular, use every day.

Between the ages of 12 and 16, young people develop the cognitive abilities that allow them to engage with political issues and form their own opinions – and it is precisely during this phase of life that, for many young people, political education and information-gathering increasingly take place on social media^{> 8}. Unlike traditional news media, platforms such as TikTok, Instagram, or YouTube often present political content mixed with entertainment, via influencers, short-form video formats, and personalised feeds^{> 9}. The process of forming opinions must be distinguished from the development of lasting attitudes and values^{> 10}. However, both dimensions are relevant to the democratic socialisation and education of young people, since repeated expressions of opinion in algorithmically curated environments can also lead to the development of more stable political attitudes over the long term.





The key factor here is the operational logic of the underlying algorithms: They are not optimized for balance or democratic deliberation, but rather to maximise attention and time spent on a platform. Recommendation systems classify content as successful when it generates a particularly high level of interaction. According to the Federal Agency for Civic Education, these tend to be posts that are emotionally charged and sensational rather than sober and balanced.^{> 11} The emotional intensity of these platforms is far greater than that of traditional mass media: Fact-based dissent is systematically weakened by the communicative logic of these media, while emotional reactions are deliberately amplified through technical mechanisms such as “liking” or “sharing”. This operational logic can be summarised as “emotion takes precedence over argument”^{> 12}.

Furthermore, the political fringes in particular use these platforms primarily to amplify social feelings of unease, such as disappointment, loneliness, mistrust, and fear. For young people who obtain a significant portion of their political information through such feeds, this not only means a fundamentally different relationship to political information than that of previous generations – it also carries a considerable risk of political radicalisation. This is because, within this operational logic, political identities are often formed by constructing common adversaries and enemies. As group identity becomes increasingly dominant, the tendency to stereotype out-groups grows, which can be accompanied by derogatory remarks and insults.^{> 13}





Recent studies show that this dynamic is deliberately exploited by actors on the extreme political fringe: far-right groups use TikTok – with its low barrier to entry – to make initial contact. They then direct young users to more closed platforms such as Discord or Telegram, where extremist views can solidify further, shielded from public scrutiny.^{> 14}

At the same time, research shows that the often-cited “filter bubble” theory is by no means empirically proven; preexisting ideological predispositions appear to be at least as significant for the develop­ment of extreme views as algorithmic amplification effects. ^{> 15} This finding is relevant in two respects for the democratic regulation of these platforms: On the one hand, algorithmic prioritisation of extremist content threatens to exacerbate existing tendencies toward social polarisation. On the other hand, it seems important to avoid monocausal explanations and to consider media use, family and school socialisation, and broader societal conditions collectively, while also rethinking democracy education.



Many young people are well aware of the risks of digital information spaces and also use social media for political self-empowerment and participation beyond established channels. The democratic challenge, therefore, lies less in keeping young people away from social media than in making the underlying platform architectures themselves the subject of democratic design .



Toward Hybrid Intelligence: Shaping AI and Strengthening Democratic Self-Determination

Given the risks outlined for the democratic formation of young people’s opinions, the question arises as to how societies can ensure that AI-powered platforms do more good than harm. One obvious answer may be design – not to limit the opportunities offered by new technologies, but to enable their responsible use by establishing socially negotiated guidelines. This task must not be left solely to private-sector companies, especially given the economic self-interest of platform operators.





At the European level, both the AI Act and the Digital Services Act already set out requirements for algorithmic transparency and the protection of minors from manipulative platform designs. It remains to be seen whether the EU has sufficient enforcement power to actually change the behaviour of globally operating platform operators – particularly with regard to their obligation to review published content for its anti-democratic effects and, if necessary, remove it. This includes, among other things, fake news, hate speech, targeted disinformation, and group-focused hostility.

In addition, there is a definite need to specifically strengthen young people’s media literacy, empowering them to understand algorithmic logic and critically assess political information spaces – a task that schools, families, and extracurricular educational programmes must undertake together. Democracy education understood in this way should also be more closely linked to the findings of extremism research. Based on this research, experts in the field of extremism have developed sustainable measures and concepts for educational and prevention efforts.

Discussions are also taking place in the EU regarding approaches that begin at the level of technology design itself – such as a quasi-Hippocratic oath for AI engineers, intended to make the compatibility of system development with democratic and social goals binding. Here, policymakers could provide targeted incentives through funding for interdisciplinary AI safety research, which would help develop AI technologies that are human-centred and compatible with fundamental democratic values.



Federal Government Takes on the Task of Shaping AI

Technologies are not forces of nature. They are things we can and must shape. The federal government has recognised that expertise in the humanities and social sciences is needed in the design of AI technologies: In the current High-Tech Agenda for Germany (HTAD), these disciplines consequently play a key role in the responsible and human-centered shaping of society’s approach to new technologies. This is an important step in the right direction!



In Germany, the term “democracy education” is used in different ways, depending on the context. How do you interpret the term?

Kleiner-Liebau: In the German discourse several terms coexist: political education, democracy education, pedagogy of democracy, democratic education, and general promotion of democracy. To date, there is no universally accepted distinction between these terms in research nor educational policies contexts.

The term “democracy education” only emerged in the 2010s and is therefore relatively new. The focus is on the individual-centered promotion of political maturity – that is, the individual – in contrast to “democracy promotion,” which is based on a systemic perspective. While the promotion of democracy is directly aimed at system stability and prevention, democracy education aims to strengthen the civic maturity of citizens. A citizenry capable of democratic action, in turn, strengthens democracy in the long term. In political education, the following formula has therefore become established: learning about, through, and for democracy.





Democracy is understood here not only as a form of government but also as a way of life and a social order. This means that people adopt a democratic attitude, take on responsibility, and act democratically.



If the terms are not clearly distinguished from one another, how do you decide which projects should be classified as democracy education? What consequences or opportunities does this conceptual openness have for funding programs?

Kleiner-Liebau: Regardless of which terms are used in specific contexts, there is broad consensus in research and practice regarding the specific skills and competencies that are essential for people to participate in social and political life and for successful coexistence in democratic societies. Many of the programs and initiatives we support at DLR Projektträger contribute to fostering these competencies, even if they are not always addressed under the heading of “democracy education,” but are primarily designated to digital education, media education, cultural education, or education for sustainable development. In our work, we must always take these overlaps and points of reference into account. To this end, we network across departments and divisions within DLR Projektträger.





What specific skills and competencies are we talking about?

Kleiner-Liebau: Democracy thrives on the maturity of its citizens. It only works when people critically evaluate information, understand different perspectives, and are willing to take on social responsibility. Especially in the context of disinformation, social polarisation, and algorithmically driven information flows, we need educational programs that foster this. In the words of the non-profit Hertie Foundation: Democracy “must be wanted, be learned, and be practiced.”^{> 1}

Democracy education imparts a wide range of skills and competencies that empower people to participate in democracy and strengthen democratic values. People must be empowered to deal with the current societal challenges they face in democracies worldwide. This requires methodological, social, and personal competencies.

Methodological competencies include critical analysis and judgment, as well as information and media literacy. These enable people to critically evaluate information, assess sources, and, for example, recognise disinformation.

Communication skills also play a major role: People must be able to listen, argue, and express and accept criticism constructively.

In addition, there are social and personal competencies such as the ability to see things from another’s perspective and empathy, conflict-management skills and a willingness to cooperate, as well as self-reflection and ethical judgment. People must learn to adopt the perspectives of others in order to be able to argue against them as well. Finally, democracy education also fosters the motivation and ability to participate in democratic decision-making processes.



In your view, what is best practice in democracy education?

Kleiner-Liebau: In my view, a crucial point is that projects should not be designed solely by adults for children, adolescents, and young adults. The young target group should help shape the content and formats according to their own ideas and needs. However, this requires that programs be strongly process-oriented rather than outcome-oriented. The capacity for democratic action does not arise solely through the transfer of knowledge – it arises through the experience of self-efficacy and taking responsibility.





Can you give specific examples of successful programs in school and out-of-school contexts?

Kleiner-Liebau: For many years now, we have been commissioned by the Federal Ministry of Education, Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women, and Youth (BMBFSFJ) to support the competition “Demokratisch Handeln” (Acting Democratically)^{> 2}. Every year, the winning projects in this competition are examples of successful initiatives. They are diverse and vary greatly in content because they are designed by children and adolescents themselves. The projects include collaborative initiatives, exhibitions, films, journalistic pieces, podcasts, newspapers, social media projects, works of art, children’s and youth parliaments, research papers, literary and musical projects, plays, game development, and much more. The competition also offers the opportunity to continue getting involved after participating by becoming a junior ambassador – the so-called “YouBos” – and thus taking on social responsibility at an early age.